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This paper explores how the steady trends in increasing tuition costs, college enrollment,
and the college wage gap might be related to the quality of college graduates. The model
shows that the signaling role of education might be an important yet largely neglected in-
gredient in these recent changes. I develop a special signaling model in which workers of
heterogeneous abilities face the same costs, yet a larger proportion of able individuals self-
select to attend college since they are more likely to get higher returns. With imperfect
information, the skill premium is an outcome which depends on the equilibrium quality of
college attendees and non attendees. Incorporating a production function of college edu-
cation, I discuss the properties of the college market equilibrium. A skill-biased technical
change directly decreases self-selection into college, but the general equilibrium eﬀect may
overturn the direct decline, since increased enrollment and rising tuition costs increase self-
selection. Higher initial human capital has an external eﬀect on subsequent investment in
school: All agents increase their education, and the higher equilibrium tuition costs increase
self-selection and the college premium. JEL codes: J24, I21, J31
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The wage gap between college graduates and high school graduates has dramatically increased
since the late 1970s as a growing number of college graduates has entered the job market (see
Figure 1).1 During the same period, the cost of college has jumped more than twofold. This
paper explores how these trends are related to the role of college education as a signal of worker
ability to potential employers. Since a growing body of evidence suggests this signaling com-
ponent to education could be sizeable yet untapped, I construct a new signaling model of the
demand for skills, skill premiums, and college market equilibrium.
This paper departs from the standard signaling framework (Spence 1973) by focusing on
returns to education rather than costs. I assume workers face the same costs, but can expect
diﬀerent returns from education since employers are likely to perceive their worker’s ability.2
Allowing an employer to have some knowledge of a worker’s ability introduces a form of single-
crossing property, which is responsible for the worker’s self-selection. Nevertheless, since the
information available to ﬁrms is limited, they still need to infer a worker’s initial ability by using
the composition of his education group, thus preserving the value of education as a signal. One
reason I focus on these diﬀering returns rather than costs is the problematic assumption in the
literature that workers’ abilities are negatively correlated with their costs of attending college.
It seems unlikely that low-ability workers face substantially higher costs than more able workers.
On the contrary, if a large part of the cost of going to college is forgone earnings, then correlation
between ability and costs could even be positive.3 Moreover, setting up a signaling model in
which self-selection arises because of employer learning about productivity, refutes Lang and
Topel’s (2004) critique of cost-based signaling model, as they argue that the strong evidence for
employer learning limits the value of schooling as a signal of unobserved ability.
As another contribution to the literature, this special signaling model allows a totally mixed
equilibrium for college choice. It is reasonable to focus on this mixed equilibrium since a sep-
arating equilibrium does not exist, and hence the Riley (1979) critique does not apply.4 This
mixed equilibrium is not only plausible from an empirical viewpoint, but it has the additional
beneﬁt that self-selection to education–and hence the skill premium–does not depend solely
on the exogenous distribution of initial abilities in the population.
To close the college market, I introduce a college supply function into the model. I assume
1According to Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) the college to high school wage ratio was 1.45 in 1979, and
soared to 1.9 in 1986. Katz and Murphy (1992) show a decline in the wages of low-skill workers between 1979
and 1987. See also Goldin and Katz (2007), Autor and Katz (1999), Autor, Katz and Kearney (2005), and Card
(1999).
2See also Arrow (1973b) for educational signaling. See Weiss (1983) and Hvide (2003) for a setup similar to
mine, but where workers don’t know their abilities.
3A point stressed by Griliches (1977) for instance. Altonji (1993) provides evidence that the returns from
post-secondary education are higher for more able workers.
4In the standard setup, the only equilibrium surviving reﬁnements, such as the Cho and Kreps (1987) criterion,
is the Riley equilibrium which is the best separating equilibrium.
2college production uses some scientists who are in limited supply and whose wage is determined
in equilibrium. Combining this with the demand for college, I solve for the equilibrium in the
college market. I use this framework to describe the recent changes in the college market with
the augmented selection prediction.
I show that an equilibrium with positive ability selection into skill arises when it is socially
ineﬃcient for the low-ability worker to invest in schooling. I proceed to show that self-selection
increases when the cost of college is higher or when the productivity of college graduates is
lower. Finally I show that total investment in education may actually increase with college
costs. Behind this result are strategic externalities. Lower net returns to college make schooling
less attractive for all workers. When low-ability workers shift away from college, the signaling
value of going to college increases and the value of remaining unskilled simultaneously declines.
I ft h er e l a t i v ei n c r e a s ei nt h ev a l u eo fs k i l ld o minates the original increase in tuition costs,
enrollment rates can be higher. In such a case the demand for college will slope upwards.
The model also predicts human capital externalities. All workers invest more in their own
human capital when the average human capital is initially high. The equilibrium composition
of each skill level is given such that workers are indiﬀerent between the skill choices, and it is
invariant with the initial level of ability. When there are more able workers in the population,
all workers must increase their investment in education to keep the same equilibrium proportion
intact. A distinct population with a larger proportion of high ability individuals will invest more
in education as a society; this implies a dynamic divergence, which can be applied to diﬀerences
between distinct groups based on such observables as gender, nationality or race. This result
is reminiscent of the statistical discrimination literature.5 However, the multiple equilibria and
coordination failure assumption driving these results is not present here. Closer in spirit is
Acemoglu (1996), where a diﬀerent mechanism results in increasing returns to human capital.6
Moving on to the full college market equilibrium, I discuss how some exogenous factors aﬀect
both enrollment and the returns to college, taking into account the endogenous self-selection
equilibrium. An increase in initial human capital has no ﬁrst-order eﬀect on self-selection;
however, as more individuals demand education, the price of college increases, resulting in
more self-selection, lower wages for less-skilled workers, and a higher college premium. More
complex are the eﬀects when a skill-biased technical change (SBTC)–which is widely believed
to have taken place during the period I study–shifts demand toward more highly skilled workers
relative to less-skilled workers.7 The direct increase in the skill premium following an SBTC
is undermined by the lower quality of workers who now choose to become skilled. Within-skill
5Arrow (1973a), Phelps(1972), Coate and Loury (1993)
6In Acemoglu (1996) the increasing returns stem from ex-ante investment and costly search.
7See Acemoglu (2002) for a comprehensive study. See also Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998) and Autor, Levy,
and Murnane (2003) on the skill content of computerization. Krusell et al. (2000) use capital-skill complementar-
ities to estimate the skill biased change. Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994) bring independent evidence from
the manufacturing sector pointing to an increase in SBTC in the 1970’s.
3(residual) inequality increases, while the college premium declines, as was the case throughout
the 1970s. When college enrollment and tuition increase, the general equilibrium can overturn
the initial decline in self-selection, resulting in an increase in the skill premium. Such higher
levels of self-selection could account not only for the wage increase for high-skill workers but
also for the reduced wages of low-skill workers, a fact which otherwise remains a puzzle.8
There is growing evidence supporting the education signaling hypothesis. Many studies ﬁnd
as t r o n gd i p l o m ae ﬀect, which indicates there is value in education as a signal of ability. For
instance, Tyler, Murnane, and Willett (2000) ﬁnd that a General Educational Development
diploma signal increases wages by 10 to19 percent net of human capital eﬀects.9 Lang and
Kropp (1986) provide more direct evidence on signaling as an equilibrium phenomenon, and
show compulsory schooling laws aﬀect attendance decisions even for non marginal agents. In
the same spirit Bedard (2001) shows that high school dropout rates increase when the pool of
high school graduates deteriorates. These two studies clearly show that schooling decisions are
not only dependent on own schooling costs but rather on the equilibrium distribution of abilities
across schooling levels.
Almost all studies ﬁnd a positive selection bias.10 More controversial is the evidence regarding
the dynamic change in selection over time. Cameron and Heckman (1998) report a decline in the
quality of college graduates. Juhn, Kim, and Vella (2005) suggest a smaller decline in the quality
of younger, more educated cohorts. Card and Lemieux (2001) ﬁnd that new cohorts have higher
returns but do not interpret this as an increase in the ability component. Murnane, Willett, and
Levy (1995) ﬁnd an increase in the ability composition of educated workers.11 However, these
studies are primarily concerned with the returns to skill and hence estimate only the composition
of the skilled labor force, whereas this model predicts changes in the relative composition of the
skilled and unskilled pools. The strongest evidence in favor of increased ability selection into
skill is given in Steinberger (2005). Using direct new data on test scores in 1979 and 1999 he
reports a 4% rise in ability for male graduates with a simultaneous decline in the ability of high
school graduates. A direct test of the mechanisms leading to such increased selection is not
8See Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2005) for an estimate of the declining prices for low-skill workers. Autor, Levy,
and Murnane (2003) suggest possible explanations for the polarization of the labor market can be the increasing
use of computers. See Acemoglu (1999) for an alternative explanation of how SBTC changed the composition of
jobs, reducing the wages of low-skill workers.
9See also Jaeger and Page (1996). However, these diploma eﬀects could also be present because individuals
learn about their productivity while in school and can opt to drop out.
10These conclusions aggregate over ﬁndings of large selection bias (Blackburn, 1995) and a small negative bias
(Angrist and Krueger, 1991). The measure of selection is usually derived from a comparison of the ordinary
least square estimate with the unbiased instrumental variables estimate of the returns to skill, and the size of
the estimated bias depends on institutional change used as the instrument. A diﬀerent identiﬁcation is given in
Ashenfelter and Rouse (1998) who use a sample of identical twins to estimate a small upward ability bias. See
Card (1999) for a complete survey.
11Cameron and Heckman (1998) ﬁnd that the location of average ability of graduates in the baseline distribution
has steadily declined from .92 to .85 during the course of 50 years (for the cohorts born in 1916 to those born
in 1963). Card and Lemieux (2001) interpret their ﬁndings as arising from complementarities between cohorts.
Murnane, Willett, and Levy (1995) use direct test scores measures to control for the ability bias.
4available yet.
Treatments of the whole college market are few. Hoxby (1997) investigates the supply side of
college and its increased diﬀerentiation and competition. Rothschild and White (1995) present
a pricing model of college. There is ongoing interest in the demand side and, in particular, in
the eﬀect of tuition subsidies (Feldstein, 1995). Hendel, Shapiro, and Willen (2005) look at the
eﬀect of subsidies on inequality in a signaling equilibrium with credit constraints. There has not
been an attempt to look at the college market equilibrium within a signaling perspective.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model and solves for the
signaling equilibria. Section 3 analyses the mixed strategy equilibria. Section 4 discusses self-
selection, the skill premium, the investment decision of workers and welfare. Section 5 introduces
the college production and solves for the equilibrium in the college market. Section 6 concludes.
2M o d e l
To set up the model, ﬁr s tl o o ka tw h a te n t e r si n t oa ni n d i v i d u a l ’ s( a . k . aw o r k e r ’ s )d e c i s i o nt o
acquire a costly education. Workers have a range of (initial) abilities, which they take into
account when deciding whether to acquire more skills through college education. A worker’s
wages are determined in a competitive labor market where ﬁrms observe the worker’s schooling
c h o i c ea n da na d d i t i o n a lp r o x yo naw o r k e r ’ si n i t i a l ability. I assume for simplicity that workers
of various abilities and skill levels are perfect substitutes. This simplifying assumption makes
equilibrium wages depend, in eﬀect, only on the quality of workers with the same observed skill
level and leaves out the standard quantity eﬀects.12
2.1 Setup
The economy consists of a continuum of mass M of ﬁrms, and a unit mass of risk-neutral
workers with heterogeneous abilities. I identify each type of worker i ∈ {h,l} by his ability
ai ∈ Θ = {ah,a l}. A worker’s type is private information. The prior distribution of types in the
population is common knowledge and is given by (p(ah),p(al)) = (f,1 − f).
Aw o r k e ro ft y p ei chooses his skill level e ∈ E = {L,H). A strategy for worker i is a
probability distribution over the set of actions, σi : E −→ [0,1].
All ﬁrms observe each worker’s skill choice e and an additional noisy signal s ∈ S = {h,l}
on the worker’s true ability. Let the likelihood of a worker i emitting a signal s be given by the
distribution pi : S −→ [0,1], which is also common knowledge. A ﬁrm’s strategy is a wage oﬀer
we(s) where w : E × S −→ R+.
12A natural extention would be to allow for some complementarity between skill levels and also incorporate
the quantity eﬀects. See Moro and Norman (2004) for a general equilibrium model of missing information and
production complementarities.
5A ﬁrm that hires li





L) where λ ≥ 1. That is, each worker’s marginal productivity is his ability,
enhanced by a multiplicative premium of λ if the worker is skilled.13
Each ﬁrm’s payoﬀ from hiring a worker with observable (e,s) is given by the quadratic loss
function π(e,s,w)=( we(s)−λIE (a|e,s))2 where λI = λ if e = H and 1 otherwise, which is the
standard shortcut to replicate a competitive labor market outcome. Worker i’s payoﬀ from any
pure action e is given by ui(e,s,w)=we(s) − C(e), where I normalize C ≡ C(H) >C (L)=0 .
Note workers of diﬀerent types get the same utility. Their payoﬀso n l yd i ﬀer in expectation,
Eui(e,s,w)=
P
s pi(s)we(s) − C(e).
Assume the signal is informative in the sense that the likelihood of a good signal for the
high-ability worker is larger than the likelihood of a good signal for a low-ability worker:
Assumption 1 (Monotone Likelihood):
ph(s)
pl(s) increases with s.
The assumption that signals depend only on the worker’s ability and not on his skill choice
is made for simplicity.14 Throughout, lower case {h,l} denotes abilities, while education levels
are denoted by upper case {H,L}. Since σi(H)+σi(L)=1 ,Iw i l lu s eσi ≡ σi(H) to denote the
probability that an ability type i goes to college, wherever possible.
2.2 Equilibrium Deﬁnition
Let μ(·|e,s) denote the posterior distribution over types {ah,a l} after observing (e,s).
Deﬁnition 1 A perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game is a tuple {σ∗,w∗
e(s),μ ∗(·|e,s)} of
workers’ strategies and ﬁrms’ wage oﬀers and beliefs such that:





H(s) − C)+( 1− σi(H))w∗
L(s)].















i0(e)p(s|ai0) > 0, and any probability distribution over {ah,a l} otherwise.
13Skill could aﬀect workers’ productivities diﬀerentially, i.e., have λl ≶ λh without any substantial changes to
the results.
14A realistic modiﬁcation will assume that the signal is more precise for high-skilled workers, that is: ph|H >p h|L
and pl|H <p l|L.This will result in diﬀerent within-skill variance.
6Denote the expected wage a worker of type ai gets if he chooses skill level e by Ewe(ai) ≡
P
s p(s|ai)w∗
e(s). A worker’s expected wage from a skill choice e depends on his own type
through the probability term p(s|ai), and on the equilibrium composition of his skill group
through the equilibrium wage term w∗
e(s). This is the feature of the model that allows workers’
returns to increase with ability, reintroducing a type of single-crossing property, while keeping the
information externality intact. The inferred ability of a worker still depends on the equilibrium
composition. If in equilibrium the posterior probability of ﬁnding a high-ability worker is higher
in the skilled than in the unskilled group, then acquiring skill has an additional signaling value.
2.3 Types of Equilibria
Aw o r k e ro fa b i l i t yai compares his expected payoﬀ when he acquires skill, EwH(ai) − C, and
his expected payoﬀ when he does not, EwL(ai), and chooses the education level with the higher
returns given equilibrium play of all other agents. If he is indiﬀerent between the choices then
any mixed strategy is (weakly) optimal. Each type’s strategy represents the fraction of the
population of that type that plays the pure strategy skill choice. Because I am interested in a
non-trivial composition of skills, I am mainly interested in the interior (fully mixed strategy)
solution. An additional theoretical justiﬁcation for studying the interior equilibrium is that
there is no separating equilibrium, as shown below.
To brieﬂy characterize the full equilibrium possibilities, begin with two Lemmas:
Lemma 1 w∗




ai μ∗(ai|e,s)ai is an increasing function of beliefs and by the monotone
likelihood assumption (1), beliefs are an increasing function of the signal, s, that is, for all equi-
librium beliefs formed by the Bayes rule, μ∗(ah|H,h) > μ∗(ah|H,l) and μ∗(ah|L,h) > μ∗(ah|L,l)
with strict inequality for interior beliefs μ∗(ah|·) / ∈ {0,1}.
Lemma 2 Ewe(ah) > Ewe(al).
Proof. Follows from previous lemma by the monotone likelihood assumption.
Use these to prove:
Proposition 1 There is no equilibrium in which the high-ability worker reveals himself.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that ah reveals himself in skill level e.B yB a y e sr u l eμ∗(ah|e,h)=
μ∗(ah|e,l)=1so that we(h)=we(l)=we. By the previous Lemma, in the other sec-
tor e e , Ewh e(al) 6 Ewh e(ah) 6 Ewe(ah)=Ewe(al)=we where the second inequality fol-
lows from ah’s choice and the equality from the beliefs being μ∗(ah|e,·)=1 . This contradicts
Ewh e(al) >E w e(al).
7There can be no separating or semi-separating equilibrium in which the high-type reveals
himself. The proof provides the intuition: if there were an equilibrium in which the high-type
reveals himself in e, then the Bayes rule would dictate that ﬁrms believe a worker is of high-
ability when they observe skill choice e, regardless of the ability signal. But if the ability signal
has no power, there is nothing keeping the low-ability type from imitating the high-ability type.
In fact, he will weakly prefer to do so, since he always does worse than the high-ability type by
choosing e e where the ability signal has power.15
For the sake of completeness I now characterize the full set of equilibria. In what follows let
A ≡
C−al(λ−1)





Proposition 2 Characterization of equilibria in terms of workers’ strategies.



































(1−ph)+(1−σl)(1−pl) = A (which can happen only if A<0).
And there is no other equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
There are basically three types of equilibria: the fully mixed strategy, two pooling equilib-
ria, and two equilibria where the high-ability worker plays a pure strategy and the low-ability
worker mixes (and hence reveals himself). These equilibria exist in diﬀerent regions (not mu-
tually exclusive) of the parameter space. The four-dimensional parameter space consists of the
information probabilities ph and pl, the skill technology term λ,a n dt h et e r mA, interpreted
below as the social cost of having low-types invest in school.
Both types can pool on skill if the social cost of low types investing in skill is small enough.
On the other hand, pooling on L exists if there is a cost associated with low-ability types
investing in skill, or if the gains from investing are small enough. However, these two pooling
equilibria are not very robust to reﬁnements that use forward induction-type arguments.
15This result might be viewed as a weakness because it implies a discontinuity of the solution in the neighborhood
of perfect information. I address this issue in the Appendix.
8To be concrete, the pooling equilibria fail the divinity criterion (Banks and Sobel, 1987).16
According to the divinity criterion, an equilibrium can be deleted if there are beliefs regarding
oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path skill choice for which only one type of worker would like to deviate. To
adapt the divinity criterion to this setting with minimal notations, Deﬁne D(ai,e) to be the set
o fb e l i e f sw h i c hm a k e st y p eai strictly prefer deviating to e over his equilibrium strategy σ∗.
Deﬁne D0(ai,e) as the set of beliefs for which type ai is exactly indiﬀerent.
Deﬁnition 2 At y p eai is deleted for strategy e under the divinity criterion if there is another
type aj such that D(ai,e) ∪ D0(ai,e) ⊂ D(aj,e).
In other words, if type ai is willing to deviate for a strictly smaller set of beliefs, then ﬁrms
should believe that type aj is the one deviating. The pooling equilibrium is thus destroyed.
Proposition 3 The pooling equilibria do not survive the divinity criterion.
Proof. See Appendix.
These reﬁnements, however, can only eliminate an equilibrium which has oﬀ-equilibrium
belief assignments. They do not apply to the semi-separating and fully mixed equilibrium where
beliefs are set by Bayes’s rule. Consider the semi-separating equilibrium. If A>0 there is
a social cost associated with the low-ability worker getting skill, and the corresponding semi-
separating equilibrium has all the high-ability workers investing in skill. If it is socially eﬃcient
for the low-ability worker to invest in skill (A<0), then the corresponding semi-separating
equilibrium has all the high-ability workers not getting any skill.
I now turn to the fully mixed strategy.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
In the fully mixed strategy equilibrium, each worker type is indiﬀerent between the skill choices.
To gain more intuition regarding the forces at work, think about the solution in terms of the
resulting quality in each skill level instead of the investment strategies σi. Explicitly writing the
two equilibrium equations in terms of the quality variables I ﬁnd at most two mixed-strategy
equilibria, which are discussed below.
16Note that a pooling equilibrium does not fail the slightly weaker Cho-Kreps (1987) intuitive criterion. A
pooling equilibrium fails the intuitive criterion if deviating is equilibrium-dominated for the low-type but the high
type would prefer to deviate once the ﬁrm’s beliefs assign probability zero to a low type deviating. In the case
discussed here, a low type will like to deviate if the ﬁrm strongly believes a deviator is high-ability. Hence the
ﬁrst part of the criterion is never satisﬁed.
93.1 A Change of Variables: from Quantities to Qualities
Consider the following change of variables. Let φ denote the probability of ﬁnding a high-ability
worker in the skilled pool, and similarly let ψ be the fraction of high-ability workers in the
unskilled group. That is
φ ≡ p(a = ah|H)=
fσh
fσh +( 1− f)σl
(1)
ψ ≡ p(a = ah|L)=
f(1 − σh)
f(1 − σh)+( 1− f)(1 − σl)
.
These proportions of able workers in each skill group can be interpreted as the endogenous
quality of the two groups. When ﬁrms make their wage decision, they take into account these
variables, indicative of the group’s composition. Then they update this "interim-prior" based
on the additional individual ability signal. This change of variables turns out to be quite useful,
as the predictions regarding investment are limited, but the equilibrium forces are more easily
interpreted through these quality variables.
3.2 Mixed Strategy Equilibrium







. Given these beliefs, I




F i n a l l y ,w o r k e r st a k et h e s ew a g e sa sg i v e nw h e nmaking their skill decision. In the fully mixed
strategy equilibrium, the expected returns from a worker’s choices must be equalized. This boils









Plug the expressions for wages and these two equations solve for hσh,σli provided they are
between zero and one. If they are not, then a fully mixing equilibrium does not exist. Use the




φph +( 1− φ)pl
=
ψph
ψph +( 1− ψ)pl
+





φ(1 − ph)+( 1− φ)(1 − pl)
=
ψ(1 − ph)
ψ(1 − ph)+( 1− ψ)(1 − pl)
+
(C − al(λ − 1))
(ah − al)
. (4)
Each equation corresponds to an ability signal: equation (3) equates the rewards for a high
signal (s = h) from getting skill or remaining unskilled, and equation (4) does the same for a low
signal (s = l). In other words, the composition of the abilities in each skill level, φ and ψ, must
10be such that the returns to an ability signal are the same across skill levels. Both conditions
impose a positive relationship between the quality of workers in the H and L skill levels. This
is because the investment decision of high-ability workers has a positive external eﬀect on the
value of the skill group. To equate the returns across skill choices, φ and ψ must move together.
These expressions also disentangle the real value of skill from the informational value. Look-
ing at each equation separately, the last term on the right, A ≡
(C−al(λ−1))
(ah−al) , is the (normalized)
n e tc o s to fh a v i n gl o w - a b i l i t yw o r k e r si n v e s ti ns k i l l .I tc a nb et h o u g h to fa st h es o c i a lc o s to f
having imperfect information. The other two terms of the form F(q)=
qp1
qp1+(1−q)p2 are the in-
ference terms. The distribution of abilities must be such that the value added from information
just compensates for the cost.
This representation also highlights the impact of having some information available to ﬁrms.
Suppose they had no information regarding workers’ ability. In such a case, with ph = pl,
the two conditions collapse to one and the equilibrium cannot be pinned down. Adding some
information introduces a way to diﬀerentiate the returns of the two types, and substantially
reduces the number of equilibria.
In fact, since the ﬁrst equation is increasing and concave in hψ,φi space, and the second
equation is increasing and convex in hψ,φi and since workers’ mixed strategies uniquely deﬁne
the Bayesian beliefs, this proves:
Proposition 4 There are at most two mixed-strategy equilibria.
4 Results: Self-Selection, Skill Premium, and Human Capital
Investment
In this section I explore the implication of the equilibrium allocation and wages for the objects of
interest. I show that self-selection arises if and only if it is ineﬃcient for the low-ability type to
invest in skill. As for the comparative statics, a higher cost of education increases self-selection,
while a skill-biased technical change reduces it. I show how self-selection translates directly to
the skill premium, look at investment and how it responds to price changes in the economy,
show how investment increases in the initial level of human capital, and ﬁnally end with a short
discussion of welfare.
4.1 Self-Selection
Any solution hψ∗,φ ∗i can be characterized by the degree to which high-ability workers are more
concentrated in the H sector. I deﬁne an index of self-selection as the diﬀerence between the
proportion of high-ability persons in the H sector and their proportion in the L sector.
Deﬁnition 3 Let the measure of self-selection be φ − ψ.
11There is "self-selection" or "positive sorting" when the fraction of high-ability workers is
higher in the H sector than in the L sector, that is, if φ>ψor alternatively σh >σ l.A
necessary and suﬃcient condition for self-selection to arise is the following condition, which is
hereafter assumed,
Assumption 2 :I ti si n e ﬃcient for the low-ability type to invest in skill (C − al(λ − 1) < 0).
This represents the net-normalized cost of having low-ability workers pretend to be high-
ability. To make the model interesting, assume this cost is positive, that is, if information were
perfect, low-ability workers would not ﬁnd it rewarding to invest in skill. This assumption turns
out to be crucial for self-selection to arise, as I now prove:
Proposition 5 Self-selection arises iff it is ineﬃc i e n tf o rt h el o w e s tt y p et oi n v e s ti ns k i l l ,
that is, φ>ψ⇔ C>a l(λ − 1).
Proof. Assume C>a l(λ − 1) ⇔
C−al(λ−1)
ah−al > 0. Together with the ﬁrst equilibrium equation
















(1−ψ) ⇔ φ>ψ(or σh >σ l ).
Assumption 2 basically assures that selection goes the right way. The assumption serves
the same function as the standard single-crossing assumption that costs decline with ability.
However, it is not its natural analogue. A ﬁrst guess would have been that Assumption 1
(monotone likelihood assumption) is suﬃcient for self-selection since it assures that the high-
ability worker gets higher returns from skill. However, recall that Assumption 1 implies that
the high-ability worker gets higher returns on any skill level (see Lemma 3).
I could also assume that it is eﬃcient for the high-ability type to invest in skill (ah <λ a h−C).
However, I do not need this assumption. There can be a mixed equilibrium with some fraction
of both types investing in skill even if it ineﬃcient for both of them to invest.
For the next result on the comparative statics of self-selection, the following condition on






Proposition 6 Self-selection increases and the quality of unskilled workers declines ((φ − ψ) ↑
and ψ ↓) with:
(i)i n c r e a s e dc o s t s( C ↑ );
(ii) decreased returns to skill (λ ↓);
(iii) decreased productivity of high-ability worker(ah ↓);
12(iv) increased productivity of low-ability worker (al ↑), provided it is eﬃcient for the high-
ability type to invest in skill,
if Condition 1 holds.17
Proof. See Appendix.
Anything that increases the costs of skill for the low-ability worker reduces his relative
investment and increases self-selection. The empirical implications are straightforward. If indeed
there has been an increase in the real skill premium, we should expect the relative quality of
high-skill workers to decrease, as there will be relatively more low-ability workers trying to
gain from the higher returns. The quality of low-skill workers should decline in absolute terms.
On the other hand, the ongoing increase in education costs increases self-selection, that is, the
demand for college by quality applicants increases with tuition costs.
4.2 Skill Premium
Wages in this economy depend on the composition of the skill group through the information
externality. In equilibrium wages are constructed as the expected productivity of an individual
with a certain skill level and ability signal. Workers beneﬁt from an increase in the quality of
their skill group regardless of the speciﬁc signal they eventually emit:
Lemma 3 w∗
e(s) increases with p(ah|e) for all s.
Proof. By construction.
All workers within a skill level beneﬁt from its quality. Average wages increase with the
quality of the group not simply as an averaging result. Rather, the higher average wage truly
comes from increased wages for all workers in the skill group. The composition of the group
actually aﬀects prices and is not a phantom "composition eﬀect" which can be control for in
wage regressions.
With this in mind, it is natural to deﬁne the skill premium as the diﬀerence between expected







ai p(ai|e)ai . The actual realization of the wage is just some
noise around these means.
Deﬁnition 4 The skill premium is deﬁned as EwH − EwL.
And so,
Proposition 7 The skill premium increases with selection.
17This condition is only a convenient suﬃcient condition to prove this result. Rigorous simulations suggest the
result holds under much narrower restrictions.
13Proof. Writing out the expressions for expected wages results in EwH = λ(φah +( 1− φ)al)
and EwL = ψah+(1−ψ)al so that the skill premium, EwH−EwL =( λφ−ψ)(ah−al), increases
with φ − ψ.
Any parameter that increases selection, increases the skill premium. Proposition (6) shows
what these are one condition. However, a stronger unconditional result can be proved:
Proposition 8 (i) An increase in the real returns to skill, λ ↑, or an increase in the ability gap,
(ah − al)↑, directly increases the skill premium but has an indirect dampening eﬀect on the skill
premium through decreased selection.
(ii) Higher investment costs increase the skill premium through the indirect increase in se-
lection.
Proof. See Appendix.
The ﬁrst result suggests that a skill-biased technical change would have created a larger wage
dispersion without the endogenous selection adjustment. The relative shift of low-ability workers
into education reduces the relative quality of the skilled. Hence, a ﬁrm’s willingness to pay for
the higher productivity, λ, is diminished. The second result says that an increase in education
costs improves the quality of college graduates and thus indirectly increases their wages. Costs,
which are uncorrelated with abilities or wages, turn out to have an eﬀect on wages. This result
highlights an empirical implication of the model. I cannot control for selection when looking for
the skill premium because selection is part of what drives wages.
4.3 Investment in Human Capital
The comparative statics results for investment are not as clean. To see this I can back out the

















Total investment in education is therefore




which has an ambiguous sign when I take derivatives with respect to cost, productivities, and
even the "real" skill premium λ.
14This ambiguity is interesting nevertheless. The implication is that an increase in the cost of
education might actually increase the demand for education. Why would this happen? When
costs increase, skill becomes less attractive for both types of workers. However, when the low-
ability types retract from school, the quality of skilled workers improves. Firms are willing to
pay a higher wage for a worker of higher expected ability. This increase in the value of skill is
due to an increase in its value as a signal on ability. This increase in the relative value of skill
could potentially dominate the absolute increase in the cost of skill. Figure 3 presents such a
case. Wherever costs increase investment, the demand curve slopes upwards.
The one parameter that unambiguously aﬀects investment is f, the ability prevalence in
the population, which represents the initial endowment of human capital. This is an important
parameter of the economy and has a central role in an environment with asymmetric information.
Any inference on behalf of the ignorant party takes this prior ability distribution as the basis for
subsequent updating. To see how a worker’s choice depends on this initial ability distribution,
b e g i nw i t ht h ef o l l o w i n gL e m m a :
Lemma 4 Initial human capital endowment does not aﬀect self-selection or wages.
Proof. The problem stated in terms of the probability parameters φ and ψ does not involve
the fraction of able-to-unable persons, f.
Workers sort themselves into skill levels to make the returns (per signal) equal across skills.
This implies some relationship between the quality of workers in each skill level regardless of
the initial distribution of abilities. The eﬀect on wages follows, since wages depend on the
endogenous compositions and not on the original underlying distribution.
Investment, however, is aﬀected by f, the fraction of high ability individuals in the popula-
tion.
Proposition 9 Investment of both types of workers increases with initial human capital, f.
Proof. Since f does not aﬀect equilibrium φ and ψ, I only need to consider the direct eﬀect of








There are externalities to human capital. A population endowed with more human capital
will choose to invest even further in its human capital. Underlying this result are complemen-
tarities between workers’ choices. Consider an increase in the population’s ability. Since the
equilibrium fraction of able-to-unable workers has to be the same to keep returns equal, then
high-ability workers must increase their investment in skill. However, this entails an increase in
investment of low-ability types due to the complementarities.
15This result is extremely relevant when discussing the welfare of disadvantaged groups. Even
a high-ability individual will invest less in education if there are fewer able individuals in his
group. Since any identiﬁable group is subject to a separate market, I can compare what will
happen to such groups that diﬀer along the ability dimension. In a more dynamic setting, where
investment in education today aﬀects the ability of the next generation, the market is heading
toward wage dispersion and increased inequality between groups. One way to break away from
this course of events is to invest in disadvantaged groups early to increase their ability to be
productive participants in the labor market. In addition to the direct value added, there will be
the additional positive information externality just discussed.
I haven’t referred to any feature such as gender, race, or ethnicity as an identifying feature
of a group. However, this is undue caution; what I call ability is really the productivity of a
worker employed in a labor market with some speciﬁc technology. It is hardly controversial
to claim that some groups are less productive than others: new immigrants might have some
cultural or language barriers, females might not have suitable skills for a predominantly male
industry, etc. The implication of the model for these more concrete examples would be that
the increase in female educational attainment may have also been exacerbated by the increased
share of females who were now well prepared to take part in market production. Their increased
investment pulled into school females who were initially less prepared for market work.
4.4 Welfare
Welfare, too, has an ambiguous response to changes in prices and productivity. This follows
directly from the ambiguity of investment. The dead wight loss (DWL) results from the inef-
ﬁciency imposed by the information friction. It is equal to the weighted sum of eﬃciency loss
from workers investing when they should not or not investing when they should. While I have
assumed it is ineﬃcient for the low-ability workers to invest in skill (Assumption 2), only now
do I have to specify whether the high-type’s investment is eﬃcient or not,
DWL =( 1 − f)σl(C − al(λ − 1)) + f(1 − σh)((λ − 1)ah − C) if λah − C>a h (7)
=( 1 − f)σl(C − al(λ − 1)) + fσh(C − (λ − 1)ah) if λah − C<a h.
An interior equilibrium could exist where both types of workers should not invest (and indeed
would not, if information was complete) but in equilibrium they do.18
Note also that an increase in human capital investment does not always improve welfare.
I have assumed that the investment of low-ability workers is ineﬃcient, so any investment on
their part reduces welfare. Even if the investment of the high-ability worker is eﬃcient, I would
still need to weigh the relative loss and gain.
18This is the same as in the standard signaling environment.
165 Endogenous Cost of College
I now put the model in context of the college market and think about the general equilibrium
consequences of changing market conditions. Thus far, the signaling equilibrium provided the
demand for education, taking the cost of college as given. The possibility that human capital
investment increases with the cost of investment can create nonstandard results in the market.
To see the full eﬀects I need to see how the cost of college is determined in equilibrium. I
therefore specify how production of education takes place and solve for the equilibrium tuition
and quantity of students. I then discuss how the market will react to an increase in skill-biased
technology, a change in the college market structure, etc.
5.1 College Production
Tuition cost is endogenized by specifying that the production of skill uses scientists who are
in limited supply. In particular, assume that a constant fraction of expenditures is spent on
these scarce resources. This natural assumption allows for a supply curve which is not perfectly
elastic. College expenditure data suggests that college production is highly labor intensive, with
a share of expenditures on research and instruction of around 0.4.19
I therefore add a higher education sector in the following straightforward way. Assume that
production of college graduates, LH, takes as inputs a general aggregate good, Y, whose price
is normalized to one, and some scientists, S, who are in limited supply and earn a competitive
wage, w. Production of college graduates, LH, takes the Cobb-Douglas form with the share of
scientists being α,
LH = SαY 1−α. (8)
Competitive ﬁrms sell college education to students at the market tuition rate of C and
therefore face the standard maximization problem
max
S,Y
CSαY 1−α − wS − pyY. (9)
From the ﬁrst-order conditions, solve for the cost of college, C,
C = χ(w)
α . (10)
Where χ = α−α (1 − α)
−(1−α) .
The scientists’ wage, w, is given by the equilibrium in the scientists’ market. From the ﬁrms’
19Data are from The Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS).





This must be equal to the ﬁxed supply, S . Substituting for the wage, w, from (10) I have the












This is a standard upward sloping supply curve which increases with the price, C. It exhibits
economies of scale if the share of scientists is smaller than half (α<0.5).
5.2 Equilibrium in the College Market
I now solve for the college market equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 5 The college market equilibrium is given by {σ∗,w∗
e(s),μ ∗(·|e,s)} ∪ {C}, which


















where the solutions for hφ(C),ψ(C)i are given by the signaling equilibrium. The demand for
education generally has an ambiguous slope, as seen in the discussion of investment. If it is
upward sloping, there is a potential for multiple equilibria; however, only one of them is stable.
In the stable equilibrium, the elasticity of demand must be greater than the elasticity of supply.
With the equilibrium in place, I can now look at the comparative statics and show how the
model explains the recent trends and what the predictions are for selection. Consider ﬁrst a
skill-biased technical change (λ). Selection ﬁrst unambiguously declines, with a likely increase in
investment. The increase in college demand increases tuition costs, which, through the general
equilibrium eﬀect, increase selection and counteract the initial decline. The skill premium likely
increases, both from the initial skill-biased change and the second-order increase in selection.
Next, consider an increase in initial human capital (f). Investment increases, with no ﬁrst-order
eﬀect on selection. The rise in tuition fees due to more demand increases selection and the skill
premium unambiguously.
Both of these explanations ﬁt the broad facts of the college market: increased tuition, in-
creased enrollment, and an increased premium for education. These explanations diﬀer along
18the new dimension that the model introduces: self-selection. An SBTC has a complex eﬀect on
selection, which can be negative if the direct and general equilibrium eﬀects are strong enough.
An increase in human capital endowment will entail an increase in selection.
The model is consistent with the college market facts. It provides a possible mechanism that
takes into account that workers have heterogeneous abilities, and that their choices may cause
an additional selection eﬀect. While there is reasonable consensus that the major changes in the
labor market over the past few years are due to a skill-biased technical change, this model oﬀers
an alternative trigger. An exogenous increase in human capital can lead to the same observed
consequences. The likelihood of such an increase in human capital is left for future research.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper presents an equilibrium model of the college market in which demand for education
is part of a special signaling equilibrium of the labor market and in which the production of
e d u c a t i o nu s e ss c a r c es c i e n t i s t sa sf a c t o r s .
The paper contributes to the signaling literature by exploring the possibility that self-
selection that is due to diﬀerential returns and not diﬀerential costs. It shows that an equi-
librium with positive selection arises if it is socially ineﬃcient for low-ability workers to invest in
education. Solving the problem in terms of the quality variables instead of the standard quantity
ones turns out to be very useful, since quality aﬀects prices in an environment of imperfect in-
formation. Stating the problem in this way allows me to derive clean comparative statics, which
do not exist for the investment variables: self-selection increases with the net cost of low-ability
types investing in education.
Finally, the model takes a step beyond the signaling framework by looking at the general
equilibrium implication of the signaling equilibrium. When the production of college education
depends on scientists in limited supply, the equilibrium wages feed back into college tuition (and
back into the equilibrium selection). An initial exogenous technological advance which biases
skill will result in decreased self-selection. The increase in high-skill wages, while somewhat
mitigated by the decline in quality, still increases the cost of supplying college education. This
increase in costs works to reverse the original decline in student quality.
The two main results of the paper have important implications for inequality and social
policy. The ﬁrst concerns the debate around the ongoing expanded ﬁnancial assistance for
education at state and federal levels. The above analysis suggests that an increase in grants
increases the relative investment of low-ability workers in education. While it may be ineﬃcient
in the short run, it will mitigate inequality. This is in stark contrast to Hendel, Shapiro, and
Willen (2005), who use a similar framework, augmented with credit constraints, to reach an
opposite conclusion.
The second result compares the education decisions of identiﬁable groups that diﬀer in their
19average human capital. The likelihood of going to college increases for all agents in the group
who have an initial higher productivity potential. Individuals with initial low ability will be
pulled up to earn an education because there are more able individuals in their group. This
suggests that early intervention programs that increase potential market productivity have yet
another beneﬁt. These programs create a positive externality on agents in the same group that
have not been treated by the policy.
The quality of skilled and unskilled labor is an evasive empirical entity. Nevertheless, this
work suggests that a better understanding of the ability composition of skill-groups is needed:
not only to correct for such compositional bias of the "real" skill premium, but as an object in
itself. It would be valuable to see how the quality of the workforce is endogenously determined
by the wages rewarded and tuition costs, and, in turn, how the quality of workers aﬀects those
same prices.
7 Appendix
The result that no separating equilibrium exists might be viewed as a weakness because it implies
a discontinuity of the solution in the neighborhood of perfect information. To see this, assume
the parameters are such that workers’ optimal choice under full information is separation. As
information gets better the equilibrium will converge to the fully separating equilibrium, but the
limit will not exist. I solve this discontinuity and restore the existence of the separating equilib-
rium by small behavioral perturbations. In this way beliefs will never ignore new information
completely.
Lemma 5 (Robustness of Proposition 1) Proposition 1 is not robust to small behavioral trem-
bles: If separation is optimal when information is complete then for any small fraction 2  of
workers of each type who randomize between the two skill levels there exists ph0 and pl0 such that
for any ph >p h0 and any pl <p l0 there exists a separating equilibrium.
Proof. For any interior beliefs μ(ai|e,s) ∈ (0,1) taking the limits as ph −→ 1 and pl −→ 0
we have limwe(h)=λah and limwe(l)=al so that limEwH(ah) − C>limEwL(ah) and
limEwH(al) − C<limEwL(al) and separation is optimal. To sustain this as an equilib-
rium the Bayesian beliefs must be interior. But this is always the case with a fraction 2 








Recall the deﬁnition of the likelihood variables ("interim-priors"):
φ ≡ p(ah|H)=
fσh
fσh +( 1− f)σl
ψ ≡ p(ah|L)=
f(1 − σh)
f(1 − σh)+( 1− f)(1 − σl)
.
20Now, express the equilibrium in terms of the four posteriors,
b φh ≡ μ(ah|H,s = h)=
φph
φph +( 1− φ)pl
b φl ≡ μ(ah|H,s = l)=
φ(1 − ph)
φ(1 − ph)+( 1− φ)(1 − pl)
b ψh ≡ μ(ah|L,s = h)=
ψph
ψph +( 1− ψ)pl
b ψl ≡ μ(ah|L,s = l)=
ψ(1 − ph)
ψ(1 − ph)+( 1− ψ)(1 − pl)
.
Proof. of Proposition 2 : Types of Equilibria.
(i) In a completely mixed solution both types must be indiﬀerent, ∀i,EwH(ai) − C =
EwL(ai). As shown in the text (section 2) these two equations can be rewritten as equations (3)
and (4). These are two equations in (φ,ψ) in the second degree. Using brute force and explicitly





(a+b)2. For the solutions
to be probabilities between (0,1) we must further have 0 ≤
a(1−b)
a−b ≤ 1 and 0 ≤
(1−b)
a−b ≤ 1 .
(ii) I show that (σh,σl)











equilibrium path beliefs to be b ψh =0and b ψl =0 . If al prefers H,s od o e sah, because he always






(iii) Is h o wt h a t(σh,σl)
∗ =( 0 ,0) can always a part of an equilibrium. Compatible beliefs
are b ψh =
ph
ph+pl; b ψl =
(1−ph)
(1−ph)+(1−pl). Assign oﬀ-path beliefs to be b φh =0and b φl =0 . If al prefers
H,s od o e sah, because he always has a higher probability of a good signal; al prefers H if




(1−ph)+(1−pl) > −A (which is always true if A>0).
(iv) I show that σ∗
h =1 ; σ∗
l ∈ (0,1) can be a part of an equilibrium if there is a solution





λ. The compatible beliefs are given




(1−ph)+σl(1−pl); b ψh =0; b ψl =0If al is indiﬀerent, ah will surely prefer H.
I therefore only require a0









is the condition for σl given.
(v) I show that σ∗
l ∈ (0,1) , σ∗
h =0can be a part of an equilibrium only if A<0. The
compatible beliefs are b φh =0 , b φl =0 , b ψh =
ph
ph+(1−σl)pl, b ψl =
(1−ph)









= A which can only be true for A<0.
Proof. of Proposition 3 (Pooling is not Divine): I show that pooling on L fails the divinity
criterion if both workers prefer skill over the equilibrium pooling, when ﬁrms believe only able





x(1−ph)+(1−x)(1−pl). Note that gi(x) is increasing and monotone in x,w i t hgi(0) = 0 and
21gi(1) = 1,a n dt h a tgh(x) >g l(x) because of monotone likelihood assumption. The conditions
of the proposition state that λgi(1) >g i(f)+A. Pooling on L implies λgi(0) <g i(f)+A.B y
the intermediate value theorem there exist xh and xl such that λgi(xi)=gi(f)+A. Because
gh(f) >g l(f) Ih a v egh(xh) >g l(xl). Except for non generic payoﬀst h i si m p l i e sxh 6= xl. Assume
xi >x j then for all x0 ∈ (xj,x i) Ih a v eλgi(x0) <g i(f)+A but λgj(x0) >g j(f)+A.H e n c e
D(ai,H) ∪ D0(ai,H)=[ xi,1] and D(aj,H)=( xj,1] with D(ai,H) ∪ D0(ai,H) ⊂ D(aj,H).
Similarly, pooling on H fails the divine criterion if both workers prefer no skill over pooling
on H,w h e nﬁrms believe only able persons don’t acquire skill.
For the proof of proposition 6 I use the shortcut notation e p for the probability of having a
high signal conditional on being in the H group, and e q for the probability of having a high signal
conditional on being in the L group, and ﬁnally e f as the unconditional probability, That is
e p = p(s = h|H)=φph +( 1− φ)pl
e q = p(s = h|L)=ψph +( 1− ψ)pl
e f = p(s = h)=fph +( 1− f)pl.
Lemma 6 Assumption 2 implies φ>f>ψi ff e p>e f>e q.
Proof. of Lemma: By Proportions 2: Assumptions 2= ⇒ φ>ψ⇐⇒ σh >σ l. Hence φ =
fσh
fσh+(1−f)σl >fand ψ =
f(1−σh)
f(1−σh)+(1−f)(1−σl) <f .F r o m ψ<f<φ⇐⇒ ψph +( 1− ψ)pl <
fph +( 1− f)pl <φ p h +( 1− φ)pl since ph >p l
Proof. of Proposition 6 (self-selection): By implicitly diﬀerentiating the equilibrium equa-
tions (3) and (4) I get
dψ



































(1−h p)2 by the Lemma. Similarly diﬀerentiating for φ and subtracting
leaves
d(φ−ψ)




















< 0 . But by the



























(λ − 1) < 0 by assumption. All of the other parameters, except λ, have
exactly the same expression with only the leading term changing a bit with the appropriate
signs. So I only need to check the derivative with respect to λ. This is messy, but it turns out
that the same condition is suﬃcient for
d(φ−ψ)
dλ < 0.
Proof. of Proposition 7 (skill premium): Adding the appropriate λ to the proof of proposition(6)
Ih a v e
d(λφ−ψ)




















< 0 which is true
by the Lemma proceeding Proposition(6). Note there is no need for condition1.
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Source: Current Population Survey (CPS) data for the United States. College enrollement is
calculated as the percent of the population 18 to 24y e a r so l de n r o l l e di nc o l l e g e .T h ec o l l e g ew a g e
gap is calculated as the ratio of median earnings of college graduates to high-school graduates.
Earnings (in 2006 dollars) are taken for all full-time, full-year wage and salary workers ages
25-34.
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